The past six decades have seen rising interest in the philosophy of time, driven in large measure by the metaphysical implications of the physical theories of relativity and quantum mechanics. Philosophical theology has only recently begun serious interaction with contemporary metaphysics of time. In particular, the issue of God's temporal mode of being has come under investigation In Part 1, I begin with the metaphysics of time, explicating and defending a causal account of dynamic time. I then consider objections that (...) can be brought against this account from the standpoint of the Special and General Theories of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, and conclude that one of the objections are compelling. In Part II, I consider the evidence from Scripture relative to God's temporal mode of being, and find that it is neutral between a temporal and an atemporal conception. The arguments upholding the medieval consensus in philosophical theology of divine timelessness are evaluated, along with contemporary arguments for atemporality. Openness to divine temporality is discernible in some medieval philosophers; their arguments, along with contemporary arguments for temporality, are investigated. I then offer an analysis of the concept of omnitemporality which I take to be the form of temporality most appropriate to expressing God's temporal mode of being. Finally I argue that objections to omnitemporality are not forceful, and that the concept has in its favor greater explanatory power for a range of issues in philosophical theology. (shrink)

Philosophy is thinking critically about questions that matter. But many people find philosophy intimidating, so they never discover how it can help them engage ideas, culture, and even their faith. In this second edition of a classic text, Garrett DeWeese and J. P. Moreland use straightforward language with plenty of everyday examples to help to make philosophy a little less difficult.

This book introduces the field of hermeneutics through a critique of military operations in Afghanistan. Following a brief survey of modern political history of the country, the authors examine the link between cultural factors and the inefficiency of nation-building operations. Additionally, the project discusses contending academic approaches to culture, and identifies shortcomings in their theoretical propositions for military operations in failed states. Ultimately, this volume contextualizes the evolution of hermeneutical thinking and the benefits it provides in assessing the transformation of (...) culture through military intervention. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that science textbooks do not present an accurate account of how scientific inquiry has been conducted and is conducted now. The chemistry textbooks that are used in middle school and high school use a “Great Man” theory in which all scientific discovery is attributed to a single man. However, scientific inquiry is a cooperative, collaborative effort, and it has been that sort of activity for at least the last 150 years. If girls, in general, tend (...) toward greater cooperation, as many social scientists suggest, a more accurate account of how science is done would bring more girls into the study of science. These authors suggest that science textbooks used during the times at which girls are formulating their opinions of science (the middle and high school years) should be modified to correctly reflect the fact that science and scientists are cooperative. (shrink)

The thesis that there can be vague objects is the thesis that there can be identity statements which are indeterminate in truth-value (i.e., neither true nor false) as a result of vagueness (as opposed, e.g., to reference-failure), "the singular terms of which do not have their references fixed by vague descriptive means". (if this is "not" what is meant by the thesis that there can be vague objects, it is not clear what "is" meant by it.) the possibility of vague (...) objects should not be taken, in itself, to imply the more radical thesis that the identity relation can be one of "degree". one can hold that the concept of degrees of identity is absurd (how can one thing be more or less identical to another?) "and" that indeterminacy in identity is possible; hence, any incoherence in the idea of degrees of identity does not thereby undermine the idea of indeterminate identity. (shrink)

Decision-making capacity (DMC) is, in many ways, a central organizing concept of modern health care ethics. Patients with DMC have the moral—if not always the legal—authority to make all manner of...

Health care costs have been rising steadily in most industrialized countries. These increases are driven primarily by technological advances and, to a lesser degree, by aging of the population. Many factors make it unlikely that market forces alone will limit increases in the costs of health care. These unremitting increases make health care rationing appear both necessary and inevitable.One of the least controversial mechanisms for rationing could be to allow patients to make their own choices as to which kinds of (...) care they would be willing to forgo. This is appealing because it preserves individual freedom of choice regarding health care in a way that other rationing mechanisms often do not. Rationing by patient choice, however, can only happen if patients recognize that resources are limited and need to be conserved, and are willing to forgo marginal benefits. (shrink)

This note criticizes Andrew Brennan's attempt to defend best?candidate theories of the identity of artefacts over time against certain now familiar objections. Adoption of a mereological conception of individuals does not, in itself, provide the means for a satisfactory response to objections of Wiggins and Noonan (some of which are anyway ill?focused). The way forward consists in recognizing that the consequences of best?candidate theories which have been thought objectionable (in particular, commitment to the extrinsicness of identity) do not violate the (...) necessity of identity and imply ? what anyway ought to seem unexceptionable ? that a predicate such as ?constituting the ship which is the Ship of Theseus? does not denote a genuine property of the hunk of matter of which the predicate is true. Once these consequences have been clearly mapped out, the best?candidate theorist's commitment to the extrinsicness of identity does not appear absurd. (shrink)

The online version of the original article can be found under doi:10.1007/s11948-000-0001-7.

I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self-consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and 'I'-thoughts.

Thomas Jefferson and Philosophy: Essays on the Philosophical Cast of Jefferson’s Writings is a collection of essays on topics that relate to philosophical aspects of Jefferson’s thinking over the years. Much historical insight is given to ground the various philosophical strands in Jefferson’s thought and writing on topics such as political philosophy, moral philosophy, slavery, republicanism, wall of separation, liberty, educational philosophy, and architecture.

Bell's theorem is expounded as an analysis in Bayesian probabilistic inference. Assume that the result of a spin measurement on a spin-1/2 particle is governed by a variable internal to the particle (local, “hidden”), and examine pairs of particles having zero combined angular momentum so that their internal variables are correlated: knowing something about the internal variable of one tells us something about that of the other. By measuring the spin of one particle, we infer something about its internal variable; (...) through the correlation, about the internal variable of the second particle, which may be arbitrarily distant and is by hypothesis unchanged by this measurement (locality); and make (probabilistic) prediction of spin observations on the second particle. Each link in this chain has a counterpart in the Bayesian analysis of the situation. Irrespective of the details of the internal variable description, such prediction is violated by measurements on many particle pairs, so that locality—effectively the only physics invoked—fails. The time ordering of the two measurements is not Lorentz-invariant, implying acausality. Quantum mechanics is irrelevant to this reasoning, although its correct predictions of the statistics of the results imply it has a nonlocal—acausal interpretation; one such, the “transactional” interpretation, is presented to demonstrable advantage, and some misconceptions about quantum theory are pursued. The “unobservability” loophole in photonic Bell experiments is proven to be closed. It is shown that this mechanism cannot be used for signalling; signalling would become possible only if the hidden variables, which we insist must underlie the statistical character of the observations (the alternative is to give up), are uncovered in deviations from quantum predictions. Their reticence is understood as a consequence of their nonlocality: it is not easy to isolate and measure something nonlocal. Once the hidden variables are found, all the problems of quantum field theory and of quantum gravity might melt away. (shrink)

Bell's theorem is expounded as an analysis in Bayesian inference. Assuming the result of a spin measurement on a particle is governed by a causal variable internal (hidden, “local”) to the particle, one learns about it by making a spin measurement; thence about the internal variable of a second particle correlated with the first; and from there predicts the probabilistic result of spin measurements on the second particle. Such predictions are violated by experiment: locality/causality fails. The statistical nature of the (...) observations rules out signalling; acausal, superluminal, or otherwise. Quantum mechanics is irrelevant to this reasoning, although its correct predictions of experiment imply that it has a nonlocal/acausal interpretation. Cramer's newtransactional interpretation, which incorporates this feature by adapting the Wheeler-Feynman idea of advanced and retarded processes to the quantum laws, is advocated. It leads to an invaluable way of envisaging quantum processes. The usual paradoxes melt before this, and one, the “delayed choice” experiment, is chosen for detailed inspection. Nonlocality implies practical difficulties in influencing hidden variables, which provides a very plausible explanation for why they have not yet been found; from this standpoint, Bell's theoremreinforces arguments in favor of hidden variables. (shrink)

In this discussion paper, I evaluate some arguments of Mark Johnston's which appear in his articles «Fission and the Facts» and «Reasons and Reductionism» . My primary concern is with his description of fission cases, and his assessment of the implications of such cases for value theory. In particular, Johnston advances the following three claims:Rejecting the intrinsicness of identity is an arbitrary response to the paradox of fission;Fission cases involve indeterminate identity;Contra Parfit, fission cases have no implications for value theory (...) in the actual world.I argue that and are false, and that , if true, is not true for any reason that Johnston gives. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;In this thesis I argue that we ought to accept some version of the Analysis view--the view that the identity of a person over time can be analysed in terms of physical and/or psychological continuities. I also argue that there is no sense in which we ought to be ontological reductionists about persons--a person is an essentially embodied, irreducible, entity whose identity over time is analysable in terms of (...) physical and psychological continuities. ;I argue that any plausible theory of personal identity over time is a best-candidate theory, which implies that the identity of a person over time can be extrinsically determined. Some philosophers find this consequence absurd; but I claim that they have no good reason to. I also show how reference to the extrinsicness of identity features in a powerful argument for Derek Parfit's thesis that identity is not "what matters". Finally, I argue that there are plausible counter-examples to all versions of the Physical and Psychological Criteria of personal identity, and that we ought to accept a version of the Mixed Criterion which acknowledges the importance of both sorts of continuity, but which assigns greater weight to the relation of psychological continuity. (shrink)